Polymarket just settled “YES” on a $16 million market asking if the Trump administration would declassify UFO files in 2025… even though no documents have been released.
The result came after late purchases of between 99 and 99.9 cents and a resolution through UMA’s Optimistic Oracle, which recorded multiple disputes before finalization.
Oracle’s process is based on a two-hour challenge window followed by a vote by token holders with a commitment and disclosure period typically lasting about two days, with proposer and challenger bonuses commonly around $750.
Votes are weighted based on tokens and misbehaving voters can be eliminated, concentrating decision-making power among the traders who supplied liquidity.
This structure explains why whales could rationally pay close to par if they believe the deal is imminent or indisputable, even in the absence of public notice.
Primary public sources do not publish any contemporaneous federal declassification notices. The National Archives UAP Resource Center lists research collections and background guidance, but does not include a December 2025 declassification bulletin.
The only post CryptoSlate could identify was the AARO post of the Pentagon’s “Official UAP Images” of 2022 “unresolved” items, which were routinely added over the past week, as part of the Department of Defense’s release stream.
According to market rules, these were not the result of a White House declassification order. Furthermore, the notes say: “the morphological characteristics, performance characteristics, and behaviors of the object are not notable and do not warrant further analysis.” No “consensus on credible reporting,” which is the other stipulation of a resolution, could be found.
The gap between a “YES” resolution and the absence of a new publicly declassified artifact focuses the story on the mechanics of oracles and market structure rather than new revelations.
Community reaction calls Polymarket a “scam”
The Polymarket comment threads became very critical after the “YES” call. Many posts labeled the result a “scam” and mocked a “proof of whale” or “proof of stake” model linked to UMA token voting.
Users alleged that whales bought at near par until the time of completion and said that token-weighted governance overrode traders’ consensus. Several urged filing supporting fines or even hiring lawyers to challenge the decision.
Some distinguished between price movements and processes. One theme was that price manipulation is “part of the game,” but “manipulating outcomes” through governance is unacceptable, reflecting distrust in the dispute process rather than just commercial dynamics.
The confusion spread to related markets. Commenters asked why a “before 2026” market could be resolved while a “before 2027” market could not, arguing that similar facts should apply. Others pointed to rule language that says ads that are not implemented within a market’s timeframe do not count.
Participants repeatedly asked when any new “evidence” would appear publicly and noted the lack of a contemporaneous press release from the US government. For critics, that absence undermined credibility, even if the oracle followed documented procedures.
A minority of responses advocated for a quick deal or urged others to “appreciate” Polymarket’s speed, but neither group provided new sources.
The market structure signs behind the dispute
Publicly shared market metadata points to an application that began in April and closed shortly after midnight UTC on December 10, following two disputes that escalated to UMA governance.
That sequence, along with late bids close to par, fits the process edge thesis.
If a proponent bets “YES” and no one fulfills the commitment within the challenge period, the proposal is approved by default and is settled. In case of dispute, the vote of token holders decides, not the balances of traders. When rules depend on intersubjective readings, oracle voters may consider a technical satisfaction based on file movements or agency publications that have not yet spread through the mainstream press.
A concise snapshot of the market timeline and volume context helps frame the question of integrity within the current market prediction cycle:
The economic logic behind late buying near par is simple. Buying 0.998 to receive 1.00 on settlement yields 0.2%, which on a $615,000 order returns approximately $1,230 before commissions. A trader made this exact trade about 10 hours before the resolution.
That trade makes sense if the liquidation risk is close to zero and the timing is close to the term, or if the platform’s incentives offset the cost of capital. According to Polymarket’s holding rewards explainer, some markets have return mechanisms that can interact with position size and holding time, although a one-hour window largely neutralizes that effect.
The current episode is situated in a line of governance outbreaks.
According to WIRED, UMA’s symbolic votes on a Zelensky clothing market and a mineral deals market in Ukraine sparked community pushback, with even Polymarket characterizing one decision as incorrect.
A Yahoo Finance review of arb activity in 2024 and 2025 describes tens of millions of dollars captured by bot-like strategies that exploit pricing errors and structural advantages, a reminder that profits often flow to speed, rule mastery, and efficient capital rather than novel information.
Macro forces amplify what is at stake. November saw record combined volumes of between $9.5 billion and $10 billion at Kalshi and Polymarket, according to data from The Block, while overall distribution is expanding.
CNBC will integrate Kalshi’s prediction data into television and digital media in 2026, bringing these probabilities to streaming quote stacks where data quality and settlement audibility are important.
At the same time, state regulators are testing the limits. The Connecticut Department of Consumer Protection issued cease and desist notices to prediction platforms operating in the state, and the Massachusetts Attorney General moved to block Kalshi’s sports contracts in court.
These actions give integrity disputes a framework of consumer protection that can extend beyond reputation and encompass legal risk.
How prediction markets can tighten contract design
In that context, the “YES” of the UFO market highlights design options that can be adjusted without stopping activity. Longer challenge windows for subjective government action contracts would reduce temporal asymmetry.
Higher bonds for proponents would increase the cost of low-quality proposals. Explicit source lists, such as White House executive action pages, National Archives bulletins, or Department of Defense releases, would limit interpretation and establish clear evidentiary thresholds.
Alternative oracle designs that direct votes to a broader or weighted set of participants could better align results with trader consensus. However, they introduce separate governance risks that must be disclosed.
A separate thread is how rumor spread interacts with markets. The SEC’s account commitment on
When the rules of a market are based on “credible reporting,” cycles like that can create shocks. In the case of government action contracts, coding primary sources reduces this gap.
Rumors, oracles and the price of “credible” signals
According to the National Archives’ UAP page, the center adds existing materials and was last updated in early 2025, and according to AARO’s “Official UAP Images” page, the December 9 entries reflect artifacts housed at the Pentagon.
Neither is a declassification order at the presidential level for December.
Polymarket’s public stance in the United States adds another layer. The platform runs a waitlist and application funnel in the US, which has been described as a possible path to broader access. Those reports should be treated as such, not a formal endorsement, unless and until a federal order establishes clear permissions.
That nuance will matter if state actions begin to cite specific contract incidents as evidence of consumer harm—for example, cases in which a merchant expects a press release from the White House but the oracle resolves based on a filing move that is technically valid under written rules.
For readers following cross-market mechanics, the resolution path here followed the process documented by Polymarket and UMA.
A proponent posted a result, disputes arose within the window, and UMA token holders voted in a cycle of commitment and disclosure.
The adapter contract executed the final price on-chain once the vote was passed.
That workflow can offer finality that differs from media narratives, and when combined with late buys close to par, can appear like manipulation to those not watching the oracle’s timeline.
The public record at federal sites shows no new December declassification by the White House, which keeps the center of gravity on governance, incentives and clarity of rules rather than disclosure.
UMA on-chain voting ended with the result “YES” at 00:27:58 UTC on December 10, according to Polymarket documentation and market metadata.
